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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, 
his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
v. 
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL, 
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 860372-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTION 
This case was assigned to the Court of Appeals by 
the Supreme Court on July 8, 1987. Although the Plaintiffs-
Respondents contend that the Defendant-Appellant lacks stand-
ing to bring the appeal, jurisdiction would otherwise arise 
from the filing of a final order in the District Court in a 
case not specifically designated for direct appeal to the 
Supreme Court and from its assignment power. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON THE APPEAL 
I. Whether this appeal should be dismissed because the Appel-
lant lacks standing to complain about the correction of a 
clerical error and because the Appellant has quit-claimed all 
right, title and interest in the subject property. 
II. Whether an Appellant who has agreed to a settlement which 
included quieting title and who subsequently quitclaimed all 
right, title and interest in the subject property can object 
to the correction of a judgment to provide the opposing party 
with quiet title to the property. 
III. Whether the correction of a clerical error in a dismiss-
al order to reflect the terms of a settlement agreement and 
minute order should be affirmed on appeal. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes, rules and other materials have been 
set forth in the addendum ("Ad.") to this brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-13 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-36 
Rule 60(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Excerpts from Defendants-Respondents1 brief in 
Case No. 86-0178CA ("Alco Appeal Brief") 
Order and Judgment (certified August 33, 1986) 
REQUEST TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
The Plaintiffs-Respondents request that this Court 
take judicial notice of pleadings, orders, decisions, exhibits 
and opinions in related actions, deeds and other like documen-
tary materials. The Plaintiffs-Respondents have moved the 
Court to consolidate this matter with another pending case 
involving the subject property: William D. Blodgett and 
Florence G. Blodgett, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Zions First 
National Bank, Defendant, Stanley L. Pace and Allan D. McComb, 
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individually and dba ALCO Investment/ Defendants-Appellants, 
No. 86-0178-CA. From time to time, this brief will cite to 
the record in that case as "Alco record". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The Parties. 
The Plaintiffs-Respondents William D. Blodgett and 
his wife Florence G. Blodgett (the "Blodgetts") were owners of 
two tracts of property in Salt Lake County. That property is 
the subject of this action and has been the subject of six 
other legal proceedings involving them. 
The Defendant-Appellant Betty Purcell, also known as 
Betty Purcell Martsch, was formerly the president of the Raco 
Car Was System ("Raco"). Ms. Purcell instigated a scheme to 
use the Blodgetts1 property as security for her proposed car 
wash ventures. 
2. The Underlying Facts. 
Ms. Purcellfs statement of facts omits several cru-
cial and undisputed facts which explain why judgment quieting 
title was entered by the District Court in this case. 
This case is the culmination of the transactions 
beginning in 1971 when Ms. Purcell and Raco falsely represent-
ed to a bank that two tracts of land owned by the Blodgetts 
could be used as security for a loan to Raco. The Blodgetts 
had agreed to permit only one tract to be used as security, 
but they were deceived into signing papers covering two 
tracts. Raco fell into arrears on the loan, and both tracts 
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were taken from the Blodgetts under foreclosure proceedings 
which were improperly conducted. Extensive proceedings fol-
lowed. In a suit against Ms. Purcell and others, the 
Blodgetts recorded a lis pendens on the property on November 
4, 1974 with the Salt Lake County Recorder in Book 3714, Page 
334, giving notice that they had filed suit to terminate the 
interests of all defendants, including Ms. Purcell. See 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978). 
After a motion for summary judgment and an appeal 
with a remand to the District Court, the parties to the 
Blodgetts1 litigation agreed on the record to a settlement of 
their disputes which included quieting title to the disputed 
property in the Blodgetts. The settlement terms were recited 
and approved in open court on December 7, 1979, before Judge 
Baldwin. The settlement terms stated by counsel and court 
were, in relevant part: 
MR. BUSHNELL [attorney for the Blodgetts]: 
We'll get the quit-claims we want signed, 
you get the releases and satisfactions you 
want signed. Why don't you prepare the 
release you want for the bank and get the 
check and we'll go from there. Will that be 
all right? 
THE COURT [Judge Baldwin]: A dismissal with 
prejudice of the action. 
MR. BUSHNELL: We'll prepare the dismissal. 
MR. BARKER [attorney for Betty Purcell]: If 
you want quit-claim deeds, we are going to 
mail them to Idaho and get them back. This 
is a few days mail time. 
_4_ 
MR. BUSHNELL: Lets get all of it done plus 
that-- well--
MR. BARKER: If you can do it by the Court 
Order and quiet title to the matter--
MR. BUSHNELL: Let's get the deed too. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BARKER: Very good. 
(Alco Record 103-07, emphasis added.) 
In its minute order, the District Court referred to 
the terms set forth on the record as the terms which were 
agreed to in settlement. On January 15, 1980, Ms. Purcell 
executed a quitclaim deed and delivered it to the Blodgetts 
pursuant to the terms approved in the Settlement Order. (Alco 
Record 109-12) Because of clerical oversight, the final Stipu-
lation of Dismissal signed by the parties and Order entered in 
the case on May 5, 1980, did not quiet title but only dis-
missed all claims with prejudice. (Record 990, copies of the 
Stipulation and Order are attached to Ms. Purcell1s brief.) 
At about the time that Ms. Purcell was involved in 
using the Blodgett's property to secure the Raco loan, Ms. 
Purcell, together with her former attorney Lorin Pace, also 
obtained a separate loan from Zions First National Bank 
("Zions"). Ms. Purcell and Mr. Pace both signed a promissory 
note in connection with the Zions loan. The Zions loan subse-
quently fell into default. Zions brought three court proceed-
ings against Ms. Purcell and Mr. Pace and took default judg-
ments against both parties to the note. Mr. Pace paid Zions 
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pursuant to a default judgment, and Zions purportedly assigned 
its default judgments against Ms. Purcell to Alco Investment, 
which apparently took the assignment from Zions pursuant to an 
agreement between Mr. Pace and Alco. Alco's principals were 
Stanley L. Pace and Allan D. McComb. (See the excerpts from 
the Respondents1 brief in that case in the Addendum for cita-
tions and further details.) 
In its efforts to recover against Ms. Purcell on the 
assignment of the Zions default judgments, Alco attempted to 
foreclose on the Blodgetts1 land because Ms. Purcell had had, 
at one time, an interest in the property. (The details are 
set forth in the excerpts from the Alco Appeal brief in the 
Addendum.) 
Alco's foreclosure efforts showed that although Ms. 
Purcell had quitclaimed all of her right, title and interest 
in the Blodgetts1 land to the Blodgetts and had agreed to the 
terms of a court settlement including quieting title to the 
Blodgetts, no judgment or other document recorded the language 
of quieting title to that land in the Blodgetts. The 
Blodgetts thus took steps under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure to correct the error in the prior judgment, 
incorrectly denominating their initial motion under Rule 60(b) 
rather than as a clerical correction under Rule 60(a) to sup-
ply the terms of "quiet title" as they had been read into the 
record before the District Court. That mistake was subsequent-
ly recognized and an order and judgment of quiet title was 
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entered pursuant to Rule 60(a) on August 13, 1986, upon signa-
ture of Honorable David B. Dee. (A copy is appended to Ms. 
Purcellfs brief.) 
That Order and Judgment to Quiet Title did not con-
tain the hand-written word "Amended" at the time signed. The 
first page of a certified copy of that Order and Judgment 
shows that it was filed in the Clerk's Office on August 13, 
1986 and that it was recorded on August 15, 1986 with the 
Recorder in Salt Lake County. Counsel for the Blodgetts ob-
tained a certified copy of that Order and Judgment on August 
13, 1986. A copy of the Order and Judgment of Quiet Title 
showing the Clerk's and the Recorder's stamps is set forth in 
the Addendum. At some other date, some party unknown to the 
Blodgetts apparently added the handwritten word "Amended" to 
the first page. The copy of the Order and Judgment attached 
to Ms. Purcell's brief shows the stamp showing filing with the 
clerk's office on August 13, 1986, but does not show the stamp 
of the County Recorder. It is also not a certified copy, as 
is the copy which had been relied upon by the Blodgetts. In 
short, at the time the Order and Judgment was signed by Judge 
Dee, it was not denominated as "Amended". 
On January 16, 1986, the District Court, per Sawaya, 
J., denied summary judgment to Alco, Stanley L. Pace and Allen 
D. McComb and granted judgment to the Blodgetts, providing: 
"Title to the above-identified real property is quieted in the 
plaintiffs [the Blodgetts] as against any and all right, ti-
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tie, or interest claimed by the defendants, Zions First Nation-
al Bank and Stanley L. Pace and Allen D. McComb dba Alco In-
vestment." Since those defendants sought to foreclose on the 
property solely because of Ms. Purcell!s prior interests in 
the property, the January 16, 1986 decision of the District 
Court quieting title in the Blodgetts also resolves any claims 
of Ms. Purcell. (See the excerpts from the Alco Appeal 
brief in the Addendum.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Since Ms. Purcell quitclaimed all right, title and 
interest to the property to the Blodgetts more than two years 
ago, the fact that the Blodgetts have quieted title to that 
property in themselves causes no grievance of any sort to Ms. 
Purcell. Quieting title neither vests title nor increases the 
rights that the Blodgetts already had pursuant to the quit-
claim deed, so Ms. Purcell has suffered no loss or injury. 
With no loss or injury, she has no standing to appeal from an 
order which merely corrected an old judgment. Moreover, since 
the initial litigation proceedings between the Blodgetts and 
Ms. Purcell involved the filing of a lis pendens by the 
Blodgetts, the resolution of the dispute over the property was 
binding upon Ms. Purcell and divested her of all claims of 
right, title or interest in that property. 
Since the correction was not a "further proceeding" 
and since her prior attorney has neither died nor in any way 
been limited from practice in Utah, the Blodgetts were under 
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no statutory duty or obligation to advise her to obtain other 
title before correcting a clerical error in an old judgment. 
There is no irregularity in the procedure. 
Courts have at any time the power to correct cleri-
cal errors under Rule 60(a); the error in question was merely 
that so the correction was proper. The fact that the 
Blodgetts initially referred to Rule 60(b) before correcting 
their application for corrective action does not give rise to 
an appealable issue or cause any problem in the corrected 
judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A PARTY WHO HAS AGREED TO QUIET TITLE AND HAS 
QUITCLAIMED ALL RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST IN A PROPERTY 
SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM CONTESTING A CLERICAL 
CORRECTION TO A JUDGMENT 
Since it is undisputed that the Blodgetts had filed 
a lis pendens in 1974 on the subject property, any interest 
which Ms. Purcell had against the property is subject to the 
lis pendens. Her interest was extinguished when the Blodgetts 
prevailed in their litigation against her, and she is bound by 
the results of the case. 
Ms. Purcell agreed to a settlement which dismissed 
all claims and which provided for quieting title in the 
Blodgetts, as stated on the record of the trial court. She 
subsequently signed and delivered a quitclaim deed to the 
subject property. The quitclaim, by statute, abolished and 
surrendered all of her right, title and interest in the 
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property so quitclaimed to the Blodgetts. Utah Code Ann. 
57-1-13 provides that 
Such deed when executed as required by 
law shall have the effect of a conveyance of 
all right, title, interest and estate of the 
grantor in and to the premises therein de-
scribed and all rights, privileges and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the 
date of such conveyance. 
The District Court, in two proceedings, has recog-
nized that Ms. Purcell has no interest in the subject 
property: in this proceeding and in the Alco proceeding. The 
District Court recognized in that case that title had been 
quieted in the Blodgetts with respect to the claims there 
related to her. (An appeal is pending in that case, No. 
860178CA.) 
Consequently, Ms. Purcell lacks standing to object 
to the order and judgment which correctly reflects the title 
quieted in the Blodgetts. This appeal should be dismissed. 
II. THE JUDGMENT TO QUIET TITLE DOES NOT 
ADD OR CONFER NEW RIGHTS ON THE BLODGETTS OR 
TAKE ANY RIGHTS FROM MS. PURCELL 
Because of her quitclaim in settlement of complicat-
ed litigation, Ms. Purcell has no right, title or interest in 
the property. Consequently, she has suffered no injury whatso-
ever because the Blodgetts have corrected a judgment to re-
flect the terms of the settlement by quieting title in them. 
They gained nothing which they did not already have, and Ms. 
Purcell has lost nothing. If she has lost nothing, then she 
has no injury and no claim. She lacks standing, she lacks a 
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claim upon which relief could be granted, and she lacks any 
legal or equitable reason to justify this appeal. 
Both Supreme Court decision and statute demonstrate 
that a quiet title action quiets an existing title and does 
not establish title. As the Supreme Court has determined: 
We are compelled to conclude that the 
decree quieting title did not constitute a 
vesting of title. Our conclusion is prem-
ised upon the fact that a quiet title ac-
tion, as its name connotes, is one to quiet 
an existing title against an adverse or 
hostile claim of another and not one brought 
to establish title. One seeking such 
equitable relief must allege title, entitle-
ment to possession, and that the estate or 
interest claimed by others is adverse or 
hostile to the alleged claims of title or 
interest. Hence it is to be seen that the 
effect of a decree quieting title is not to 
vest title but rather is to perfect an 
existing title as against other claimants. 
State, Etc. v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335, 337-38 (Utah 1979) 
(footnotes to citations omitted) 
In this case, the Blodgetts were engaged in litiga-
tion adverse to Ms. Purcell and others. They had filed a lis 
pendens on the subject property. They resolved the case by 
settlement in open court, including quieting title to the 
property. Ms. Purcell quitclaimed. Title thus resided in the 
Blodgetts upon the settlement of that case. When the Alco 
litigation erupted and Alco tried to claim the property be-
cause Ms. Purcell had once had an interest in it, it was neces-
sary for the Blodgetts to defend their property by correcting 
an old judgment to reflect the outcome of prior suits. Under 
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such circumstances, even though somewhat complex, only one 
simple conclusion can be reached: Ms. Purcell has lost noth-
ing, the Blodgetts have gained nothing, and no new title has 
vested; title has only been perfected as it has existed for 
over a decade. This appeal should be dismissed. 
III. CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS SHOULD NOT BE 
APPEALABLE; THE SUBSTANCE OF A TRANSACTION IS 
DETERMINATIVE OF ITS MERITS 
When the Blodgetts were surprised by the efforts of 
Alco and its principals to take their property, they took 
immediate steps to rectify what was, in fact, a clerical or 
mechanical error in the recording of the judgment. While it 
was abundantly clear that all litigation had been resolved and 
that the Blodgetts were to retain the property which had been 
in question, the final dismissal order was a simple one, pre-
pared in summary form to rid the parties of the burdens of 
further litigation and to dismiss all claims. 
In conjunction with that settlement, Ms. Purcell, as 
stated, delivered her quitclaim deed. The mechanical error 
arose because the judgment did not record the oral settlement 
by reciting the formulary words "quiet title", although that 
was clearly the central term of the settlement and the reason 
why it was acceptable to the Blodgetts. Inadvertently, every-
one relied on the simple settlement dismissing all claims with 
prejudice and the delivery of the quitclaim deed. 
The Alco efforts to obtain the property revealed the 
oversight, justifying a correction under Rule 60. The motion 
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for the correction was originally brought under Rule 60(b), 
although it should have been done under Rule 60(a). This 
matter was discussed in District Court and rectified. The 
District Court clearly recognized the need to correct the 
clerical error. Such is the substance of the transaction; it 
does not give rise to an appealable order. Such corrections 
of errors may even be made after an appeal has been taken. 
See Baqnall v. Suburbia Land Co.# 579 P.2d 917 (Utah 1978). 
If this Court were to vacate the corrected judgment, 
thus requiring further proceedings below, then hearings on the 
meaning and terms of the settlement would occur. The result 
would undoubtedly be that the Blodgetts were entitled to quiet 
title, and an appropriate judgment reflecting the quiet title 
language would be entered. Ms. Purcell would, as here, have 
lost nothing in such proceedings—except the time and costs 
necessary to prolong litigation. She could gain nothing from 
those proceedings. Further proceedings in this matter would 
be superfluous. Indeed, it appears that the only possible 
motivation for the attempted appeal in this case is that Ms. 
Purcell knows that Alco and its principals are trying to col-
lect against her in connection with her default on the loan to 
Zions; it would be much to her advantage if Alco could collect 
against property in which she no longer has any interest rath-
er than against her current assets. 
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IV. THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF STATUTE 
CONCERNING MS. PURCELL'S COUNSEL 
Ms. Purcell's argument that the corrected judgment 
was taken against her improperly because she had no notice to 
obtain counsel is flawed. Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-36, the 
statute she cites, is limited to the situation "When an attor-
ney dies or is removed or suspended" from practice. Ms. 
Purcell's former attorney, Ronald C. Barker, Esq., is a prac-
ticing attorney. The statute does not apply if the attorney 
has withdrawn from the case or if there are other circumstanc-
es in which he chooses not to represent a client; it applies 
only if he dies or is disbarred or otherwise removed or sus-
pended from the practice of law. Van Cott v. Wall, 53 Utah 
282, 170 P. 42 (Utah 1918), see also Security Adjustment 
Bureau, Inc. v. West, 20 Utah 2d 292, 437 P.2d 214 (Utah 
1968). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-36 is further limited to the 
situation when "further proceedings" are to be had against the 
party whose attorney is no longer representing him. In this 
situation, the Blodgetts sought no "further proceedings." 
Rather, the Blodgetts sought to correct the judgment in the 
old and existing proceedings. They were simply reciting in 
their judgment that which Ms. Purcell and her counsel had 
agreed to before: that title be quieted in the Blodgetts. 
The correction of a clerical error or other mistake under Rule 
-14-
60(a) cannot be construed as a "further proceeding." No viola-
tion of any obligation has occurred. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED THE ORDER AND 
JUDGMENT TO QUIET TITLE PURSUANT TO 
RULE 60(a) 
To correct the error in the original dismissal or-
der, the Blodgetts served Ms. Purcell and filed on March 17, 
1986 a Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and Enter Judg-
ment of Quiet Title under Rule 60(a). That Rule provides: 
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders 
or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission 
may be corrected by the court at any time 
of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as 
the court orders. 
(Emphasis added) 
In Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 
P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983), this Court construed Rule 60(a), 
defining a clerical mistake as one which is mechanical in 
nature, is apparent on the record and does not involve a legal 
decision or judgment by an attorney. The distinction between 
a judicial error and a clerical error does not depend upon who 
made it; rather, the distinction depends on whether it was 
made in entering the judgment (judicial error) or in recording 
or reflecting the judgment as rendered (clerical error). 
See Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143, 
145 (1970). Corrections contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be 
undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention 
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of the court and the parties. See Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 
P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984). 
Under the criteria set forth in Stanger, Rich-
ards and Lindsay, the omission of the quiet title language 
in the Dismissal Order constituted a "clerical error." The 
error was mechanical and occurred in the course of recording 
or reflecting a judgment, since the court agreed to a "quiet 
title" in the record but the written judgment neglected to 
recite the formulary words. Making the correction required no 
decision or judgment of an attorney; the correction arose 
naturally and from the plain records of the settlement which 
had been approved by Judge Baldwin. Certainly Ms. Purcell has 
no complaint about it since she has already delivered a quit-
claim deed. 
In Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196, 299 
P.2d 827 (1956), this Court reviewed a case in which the trial 
judge signed an order on the erroneous assumption that the 
order, as prepared by counsel, correctly reflected his judg-
ment in the matter. The Supreme Court held that the execution 
of the order was a mistake of a perfunctory or clerical nature 
since the order did not accurately reflect the result of the 
trial court's judgment and that the trial court could and 
properly did correct the error upon its own motion. 
In this case, the trial judge executed an order, 
assuming that all aspects of the settlement previously ap-
proved had been covered. The error was perfunctory and cleri-
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cal. It was properly correctable by the Blodgetts1 Rule 60(a) 
motion. This appeal is thus lacking in merit and should be 
dismissed. The corrected order should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Blodgetts respectful-
ly request that this appeal be dismissed, that the judgment 
correcting the original dismissal order in their favor be 
affirmed and that the Court award them their costs, disburse-
ments and counsel fees on this action. They seek such other 
and further relief as may be just and proper. 
DATED: August 14, 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
By 
M. Karlynn Hinman 
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UTAH CODE 
1985-1986 Real Estate 57-1-14 
in which such real estate is situated, but shall be 
valid and binding- between the parties thereto 
without such proofs, acknowledgment, certification 
or record, and as to all other persons who have had 
actual notice. Neither the fact that an instrument, 
recorded as herein provided, recites only a nominal 
consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in such 
instrument is designated as trustee, or that the con-
veyance otherwise purports to be in trust without 
naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms of the 
trust, shall operate to charge any third person with 
notice of the interest of any person or persons not 
named in such instrument or of the grantor or 
grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or 
such lesser interest as was conveyed to him by such 
instrument free and clear of all claims not disclosed 
by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as 
herein provided setting forth the names of the ben-
eficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and descri-
bing the property charged with such interest. < 1953 
57-1-7. Applicability of section. 
This act shall apply to all instruments, whether 
recorded prior to or subsequent to the effective date 
hereof, but as to instruments which have been 
recorded prior thereto, it shall not apply until one 
year from its effective date. 1953 
57-1-8. Powers of attorney - To be recorded. 
Every power of attorney, or other instrument in 
writing, containing a power to convey any real 
estate as agent or attorney for the owner thereof, or 
to execute as agent or attorney for another any 
conveyance whereby any real estate is conveyed or 
may be affected, shall be acknowledged or proved, 
and certified and recorded, as conveyances whereby 
real estate is conveyed or affected are required to be 
acknowledged or proved and certified and recorded. 
1953 
57-1-9. Revocation to be recorded. 
No such power of attorney or other instrument 
shall be deemed to be revoked by any act of the 
person by whom it was executed until the instrum-
ent containing such revocation shall be filed for 
record in the same office in which the instrument 
containing the power is recorded, or until it is* 
canceled of record as provided by law. 1953 
57-1-10. After-acquired title passes. 
If any person shall hereafter convey any real 
estate by conveyance purporting to convey the same 
in fee simple absolute, and shall not at the time of 
such conveyance have the legal estate in such real 
estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the 
legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately 
pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors or assigns, 
and such conveyance shall be as valid as if such 
legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of 
conveyance. 1953 
57-1-11. Claimant out of possession may convey. 
• Any person claiming title to any real estate may, 
notwithstanding there may be an adverse possession 
thereof, sell and convey his interest therein in the 
same manner and with the same effect as if he were 
in the actual possession thereof. 1953 
57-1-12. Form of warranty deed • Effect. 
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the 
following form: 
WARRANTY DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of 
(insert place of residence), hereby conveys and 
warrants to (insert name), grantee, of 
(insert place of residence), for the sum of 
dollars, the following described tract 
of land in County, Utah, to wit: (here 
describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this day 
of 19 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall 
have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the 
grantee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises 
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, 
rights and privileges thereunto belonging, with 
covenants from the grantor, his heirs and personal 
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the 
premises; that he has good right to convey the 
same; that he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and 
assigns in the quiet possession thereof; that the 
premises are free from all encumbrances; and that 
the grantor, his heirs and personal representatives 
will forever warrant and defend the title thereof in 
the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all lawful 
claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such 
covenants may be briefly inserted in such deed 
following the description of the land. 1953 
57-1-13. Form of quitclaim deed - Effect. 
Conveyances of land may also be substantially in 
the following form: 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of 
(insert place of residence), hereby quitclaims to 
(insert name), grantee, of (here insert 
place of residence), for the sum of dollars, 
the following described tract of land in 
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the 
premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this day 
of , 19 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall 
have the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, 
interest and estate of the grantor in and to the 
premises therein described and all rights, privileges 
and appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date 
of such conveyance. 1953 
57-1-14. Form of mortgage - Effect. 
A mortgage of land may be substantially in the 
following form: 
MORTGAGE 
(here insert name), mortgagor, of 
(insert place of residence), hereby mortgages to 
(insert name), mortgagee, of (insert 
place of residence), for the sum of dollars, 
the following described tract of land in 
County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the 
premises). 
This mortgage is given to secure the following 
indebtedness (here state amount and form of indeb-
tedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and to whom 
payable and where). 
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and assess-
ments on said premises, and the sum of 
dollars attorneys' fee in case of foreclosure. 
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this 
day of , 19 . 
Such mortgage when executed as required by law 
shall have the effect of a conveyance of the land 
therein described, together with all the rights, privi-
leges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the 
mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal representati-
ves, as security for the payment of the indebtedness 
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78-51-33. Judicial Code 
not otherwise. 
(3) T o receive money claimed by his client in an 
action or proceeding during the pendency thereof or 
after judgment , unless a revocation of his authori ty 
is filed, and , upon payment thereof and not other-
wise, to discharge the claim or acknowledge satisf-
act ion of the judgmen t . 1953 
78-51-33. Proof of authority for appearance. 
The court may on motion of either party and on 
the showing of reasonable grounds therefor require 
the at torney for the adverse party, or for any one of 
several adverse parties, to produce or prove by his 
own oath or otherwise the authori ty under which he 
appears , and until he does so may stay all proceed-
ings by him on behalf of the parties for whom he 
assumes to appear . 1953 
78-51-34. Change of attorney. 
The attorney in any action or special proceeding 
may be changed at any time before judgment or 
final determination, as follows: 
(1) Upon his own consent, filed with the clerk or 
entered upon the minutes. 
(2) Upon the order of the court or judge thereof 
upon the application of the client, after notice to the 
at torney. 1953 
78-51-35. Effect - Notice of change. 
When an a t torney is changed as provided in the 
next preceding section [78-51-34], written notice 
of the change and of the substi tut ion of a new att-
orney or of the appearance of the par ty in person 
must be given to the adverse par ty; until then he 
mus t recognize the former a t torney . 1953 
78-51-36. Notice to appoint successor. 
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspe-
nded, or ceases to act as such, a party to an action 
or proceeding for whom he was acting as attorney 
must before any further proceedings are had against 
him be required by the adverse party, by written 
notice, to appoint another at torney or to appear in 
person. 1953 
78-51-37. Conviction of crime - Judgment of 
disbarment - Doty of clerks of court. 
U p o n conviction of an attorney and counselor of 
felony, or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, 
the judgment of the Supreme Court must be that the 
name of the accused be stricken from the roll of 
attorneys and counselors of the court , and that he 
be precluded from practicing as such attorney or 
counselor in all the courts of this state; upon conv-
iction in other cases, the judgment of the court may 
be, according to the gravity of the offense charged, 
deprivation of the right to practice as an attorney or 
counselor in the courts of this state permanently or 
for a limited period. The clerk of the court in which 
any such conviction is had must within thirty days 
thereafter transmit to the Supreme Cour t a certified 
copy of the record of conviction, which shall be 
conclusive evidence thereof. 1953 
78-51-38. Suretyship - Attorney forbidden to 
assume. 
N o practicing at torney and counselor shall 
become a surety in any civil or criminal action or 
proceeding in which he is engaged as at torney. 1953 
78-51-39. Certain officials not to practice law. 
Sheriffs, clerks of courts and constables, and their 
deputies, are prohibited from practicing law or 
acting as attorneys and counselors, or from having 
as a partner an attorney and counselor or any one 
who acts as such. 1953 
78-51-40. Corporations and associations 
forbidden to practice - Exceptions. 
It shall be unlawful for any corporat ion or volu-
ntary association, except such as are organized for 
benevolent or charitable purposes, or organizations 
approved by the Supreme Cour t and formed for the 
purpose of assisting persons without means in the 
pursuit of civil remedies, to hold itself out to the 
public by advertisement or otherwise as being enti-
tled to practice law or to furnish attorneys or cou-
nselors, or to render legal services or advice of any 
kind in any action or proceeding, or to solicit dire-
ctly or indirectly any claim or demand for the 
purpose of bringing action thereon. Any corporation 
or voluntary association violating any of the provi-
sions of this section is liable to a fine of not more 
than $5,000; and every officer, agent or employee of 
such corporation or voluntary association who dir-
ectly or indirectly engages on behalf of such corpo-
ration or voluntary association in any of the acts 
herein prohibited, or assists such corporation or 
voluntary association to do such prohibited acts, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor. The fact that such officer, 
agent or employee is a duly and regularly licensed 
attorney at law shall not be held to permit or allow 
any such corporation or voluntary association to do 
the acts prohibited herein, nor shall such fact be a 
defense upon the trial of any of the persons menti-
oned herein for a violation of the provisions of this 
section. 1953 
78-51-41. Compensation - Lien. 
The compensa t ion of a n a t to rney and counselor 
for his services is governed by agreement , express or 
implied, which is not res t ra ined by law. F r o m the 
commencement of an ac t ion , o r the service of an 
answer containing a counterc la im, the a t torney who 
appears for a par ty has a lien u p o n his client's 
cause of act ion or counterc la im, which at taches to a 
verdict , repor t , decision or j u d g m e n t in his client's 
favor and to the proceeds thereof in whosoever 
hands they may come, a n d canno t be affected by 
any settlement between the part ies before or after 
j u d g m e n t . 1953 
78-51-42. Refusing to pay over money -
Penalty. 
A n a t to rney and counselor w h o receives money or 
proper ty of his client in the course of his professi-
onal business a n d who refuses to pay or deliver the 
same to the person entitled there to within a reaso-
nable t ime after demand is guilty of a misdemeanor . 
1953 
78-51-43. Exception - Demand for bond. 
When an at torney and counselor claims to be 
entitled to a lien upon money or property of his 
client in his possession he is not liable to the penalty 
of the next preceding section [78-51-42], unless he 
neglects or refuses to pay or deliver such money or 
proper ty to the person entitled thereto upon such 
person giving a bond with sufficient surety, to be 
approved by the clerk of the district court , conditi-
oned for the payment of the a m o u n t of such atto-
rney 's claim when legally established. 1953 
78-51-44. Exception on giving bond. 
Nor shall the at torney and counselor be liable as 
aforesaid, if he shall give a sufficient bond , to be 
approved by the clerk of the district court , conditi-
oned that he will pay or deliver the whole or any 
port ion of such money or proper ty to the claimant 
in the event such claimant shall finally establish his 
right there to . 1953 
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Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial 
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. 
C.J.S. — 66 C J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq., 
115, 116, 122 to 127. 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by 
statute or rules of court. 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set-
tlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil 
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in 
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501. 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 
A.L.R.3d 1101. 
Absence of judge from courtoom during trial 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 
A.L.R.3d 126. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4thl041. 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Key Numbers. — New Trial «=» 13 et seq., 
110, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order, 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (l)mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The Parties. 
William D. Blodgett and his wife Florence G. Blodgett 
(the "Blodgetts") were owners of property in Salt Lake County 
which they seek to protect from foreclosure by Alco Investment 
("Alco"), whose partners are Stanley L. Pace ("Stanley Pace") and 
Allan D. McComb ("McComb"). 
Although Stanley Pace and McComb purport to be partners 
under the name Alco Investment (R.60 11 3, R. 71 11 3), the records 
of the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Corpora-
tions and Commercial Code do not list them as current registrants 
of the name "Alco Investment". The Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code reports that Allan D. McComb and Colleen C. 
McComb filed an application to do business under an assumed name, 
DBA Alco Investment, on September 22, 1976. Their DBA expired 
September 22, 1984, as shown by a Certificate from the Director, 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. (Ad. 4-5.) 
Alcofs foreclosure efforts began in 1985 and were made 
pursuant to an assignment of a judgment lien from Zions First 
National Bank ("Zions") to Alco after Zions had received payment 
of a default judgment on a promissory note made by Lorin N. Pace 
("Lorin Pace"), father of Stanley Pace, and Betty Purcell (aka 
"Betty Purcell Alexander" or "Betty Purcell Martsch" and some-
times spelled "Pursell"). Zions did not receive payment from co-
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maker Betty Purcell. Zions is not a party to this appeal and 
stated in its answer to the complaint that: 
18. Zions affirmatively alleges that it 
claims no interest in the subject property. 
(R. 68 11 18.) 
2. The Underlying Facts. 
This case is the culmination of some fifteen years of 
transactions and six court proceedings, including an appeal to 
this Courtf in which various persons and entities have claimed an 
interest in the Blodgetts1 land. 
The Blodgetts1 problems began in 1971 when Raco Car 
Wash Systems ("Raco"), whose president was Betty Purcell, falsely 
represented to a bank that two tracts of Blodgett land could be 
used as security for a loan to Raco. The Blodgetts had agreed 
with Raco that only one tract could be used as security but were 
deceived into signing papers covering two. They have been trying 
to recover their property ever since. 
The Blodgetts brought two earlier actions arising from the 
unauthorized actions encumbering their land. Zions brought three 
court proceedings because Betty Purcell and her former attorney 
Lorin Pace defaulted on their promissory note to Zions. After 
Lorin Pace paid $27,262.59 under his default judgment on August 
31, 1984, Zions purportedly assigned its judgments against Betty 
Purcell to Alco. Alco then attempted to foreclose on the 
Blodgetts1 property because of Betty Purcell's prior but extin-
guished interest in the property. The Blodgetts thus brought this 
-5-
action, seeking to resolve their property problems once and for 
all. 
The undisputed facts leading to this action are set 
forth in numbered paragraphs. The facts are documented in court 
filesf judgments, title documents and deeds and other such 
sources. Because of the length and complexity of the facts, a 
chronological list of the pertinent events, matters of public 
record, is set forth in the Addendum. (Ad. 6-9.) This Court may 
draw all legal conclusions justified by such facts. See e.g. , 
Betenson v. Call Auto and Equip. Sales, 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 
1982) ("It is well established that where the issue is solely one 
of law, . . . this Court is as capable of determining the ques-
tion as the trial court. . . " ) . 
1. In 1969, the Blodgetts owned two adjacent tracts of 
land located at approximately 6100 South Highland Drive in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. The Blodgetts operated a grocery store on the 
larger tract (the "Store Tract"). They leased the smaller tract 
(the "Car Wash Tract") to Raco for the installation of a car wash 
in early 1969. The lease agreement with Raco provided that the 
Blodgetts would pledge the Car Wash Tract as security for a loan 
to Raco to finance the car wash installation. Raco, acting 
through its president Betty Purcell, made arrangements for the 
loan with Valley Bank and Trust Company ("Valley Bank"). (Record 
["R."] 78, 79, 93.) 
-6-
2. Without the Blodgetts1 knowledge and prior to clos-
ing the loan, Valley Bank advised Raco that it required addition-
al security in order to make the loan for the installation of the 
car wash. Raco falsely advised Valley Bank that the Blodgetts 
had agreed that both their Store Tract and the Car Wash Tract 
could be used as security for Raco's loan. (R. 79, 93.) 
3. Valley Bank prepared a trust deed granting it a 
security interest in both the Car Wash Tract and the Store Tract. 
In addition, without first discussing the matter with either Raco 
or the Blodgetts, Valley Bank prepared a promissory note in its 
favor for signature by the Blodgetts as co-makers. (Id.) 
4. On November 5, 1971, the Blodgetts attended the 
Raco loan closing at Valley Bank's offices. They intended to 
execute documents necessary for the hypothecation of the Car Wash 
Tract alone. The only commitment the Blodgetts had made to any-
one concerning the use of any of their real property as security 
until the moment of closing was the one contained in the Raco 
lease? Valley Bank had a copy of the lease. (Id.) 
5. Although Valley Bank usually explained the terms of 
loan documents to borrowers unless they demonstrated some degree 
of sophistication, it offered the Blodgetts no explanation of the 
contents of the trust deed and, in particular, failed to call 
attention to the trust deed's departure from a material provision 
of the Raco lease: that only the Car Wash Tract would be used as 
security for Raco's loan. (Id.) 
-7-
6. Valley Bank personnel spent half an hour explaining 
the documents to Betty Purcell, although neither she nor her 
corporation was making any contribution to the real property 
collateral for the loan. Valley Bank personnel made no similar 
effort to explain the loan documents to the Blodgetts even though 
the Blodgetts announced that they did not understand them. (R. 
80, 93-94.) 
7. When the Blodgetts asked about the promissory note. 
Valley Bank falsely advised them that by executing the loan docu-
ments the Blodgetts assumed only a secondary or "stand-by" obli-
gation. The Blodgetts requested copies of all loan documents for 
review; however. Valley Bank sent them a copy of the promissory 
note only. (R. 80, 94.) 
8. The Raco loan went into default; but Valley Bank 
did not notify the Blodgetts or suggest to them that the Store 
Tract was in jeopardy. (Id.) 
9. Valley Bank foreclosed on the Store Tract in 
1973. To effectuate the foreclosure, Valley Bank utilized Wayne 
Ashworth ("Ashworth") as trustee. (Id.) 
10. Ashworth failed to comply with the procedures 
prescribed for non-judicial foreclosure of trust deeds in Utah. 
Ashworth held a public trustee's sale which the Blodgetts 
attended. By reason of their misconception that only the Car 
Wash Tract was subject to sale, the Blodgetts failed to take the 
most elementary steps to protect their interests. For example, 
-8-
they did not require Ashworth to sell the property in separate 
tracts or in a particular sequence. Moreover, the Blodgetts did 
not enter a bid even though the high bid was a small fraction of 
the property's value. The high bidder at the sale was Joe 
Martsch, a director of Raco and Betty Purcell's husband at the 
time. (R. 80, 81, 94.) 
11. Neither Ashworth nor Valley Bank consulted with, 
advised, or sought instruction from the Blodgetts before or 
during the sale. Both acted purely in Valley Bank's interest and 
took the course of action most likely to assure that Valley Bank 
would either be paid in full or acquire the tracts at a bargain 
price. (Id.) 
12. On November 11, 1973, Joe Martsch conveyed a one-
half undivided interest in the Store Tract to Water Park 
Corporation ("Water Park"), a corporation wholly owned by Betty 
Purcell. (^ IcL) Lorin Pace witnessed and notarized the 
conveyance. (Ad. 10.) 
13. The Blodgetts first became aware that the Store 
Tract had been included in the sale when Joe Martsch asserted his 
rights of ownership after the sale. In 1974 the Blodgetts 
brought suit to obtain the return of the Store Tract in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Civil No. 223407, 
against Joe Martsch, Betty Purcell aka Betty Purcell Martsch, 
Doyle Nease, Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Wayne A. Ashworth, trustee, Carl W. Tenny, Valley Bank & Trust 
-9-
Company, and First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. ("Blodgett I"). 
The Blodgetts also recorded a lis pendens on November 4, 1974 
with the Salt Lake County Recorder in Book 3714, at Page 334, 
giving notice that they had filed Blodgett I to terminate the 
interests of all of those defendants in and to the Store Tract. 
(R. 81, 82, 98, 99.) Lorin Pace represented Raco and Betty 
Purcell. See Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 1978). 
14. The Blodgett I defendants moved for summary judg-
ment. The trial court (per Baldwin, J.) granted the motion, and 
the Blodgetts appealed. This Court reversed and remanded 
Blodgett I for trial on December 26, 1978. Blodgett v. Martsch, 
supra, 590 P.2d at 304. 
15. On or about January 16, 1976, while Blodgett I was 
still pending, Zions filed an action in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, against Betty Purcell, a 
defendant in Blodgett I, and Lorin Pace, seeking judgment for 
$27,262.59 on their unpaid promissory note. Zions First National 
Bank v. Betty Pursell [sic] Alexander and Lorin N. Pace, Civil 
No. 232782, ("Zions I"). (R. 82.) A copy of the promissory note 
from Lorin Pace and Betty Pursell to Zions is annexed. 
(Ad. 12.) Zions alleged, inter alia: 
2. On or about the 7th day of July, 
1971, at Salt Lake City, Utah, the defendants 
[Purcell and Lorin Pace], and each of them, 
made, executed and delivered their promissory 
note to the plaintiff [Zions], in the amount 
of $27,262.59, payable on demand at Salt Lake 
City, Utah. . . . (R. 9 11 2.) 
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16. On March 3, 1976, Zions obtained a default judg-
ment in Zions I against Lorin Pace in the amount of $31,064.52. 
(Ad. 31.) Fifteen days later, on March 18, 1976, Lorin Pace 
filed a Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Counsel for Betty Purcell 
(but not for Raco) in Blodgett I. (Ad. 13.) 
17. On August 13, 1976, Zions obtained a default judg-
ment in Zions I against Betty Purcell in the amount of $31,064.52. 
(R. 82.) 
18. Water Park, to which Joe Martsch had conveyed a 
one-half undivided interest in the Store Tract in 1973, was 
administratively dissolved September 30, 1977. An order of the 
trial court in Zions I (per Durham, J.) concluded that Water 
Park's assets had become the undivided property of Betty Purcell 
upon the dissolution of Water Park on September 30, 1977. Thus, 
according to that order, Betty Purcell was the owner of record of 
a one-half undivided interest in the Store Tract (conveyed from 
Joe Martsch to Water Park) as of September 30, 1977. (R. 15; see 
11 24 below.) 
19. In 1978, the Blodgetts brought a second action in 
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, against 
Betty Purcell and Water Park, seeking to terminate Betty 
Purcell1s and Water Park's interest in the Store Tract. Blodgett 
v. Betty Purcell aka Betty Purcell Martsch and Water Park 
Corporation, Civil No. C78-8017, ("Blodgett II"). (R. 15.) 
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20. On March 13, 1979, Zions brought a second action 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, against 
Betty Purcell for the purpose of enforcing the judgment obtained 
against her in Zions I. Zions Bank v. Purcell, Civil No. C79-
1685, ("Zions II") . (Ad. 14-15.) 
21. On April 11, 1979, the trial court (per Durham, 
J.) consolidated Blodgett I and Blodgett II for trial. (Ad. 16-
17.) 
22. On May 1, 1979, the trial court in Blodgett I and 
Blodgett II (per Durham, J.) entered an order on default against 
Water Park, conveying all right, title and interest of Water Park 
in and to the Store Tract to the Blodgetts. (R. 83, 100, 101, 
Ad. 18-21.) 
23. On May 2, 1979, the trial court in Zions I (per 
Durham, J.) set aside Zions1 August 13, 1976 default judgment in 
the amount of $31,064.52 against Betty Purcell. (R. 83.) 
24. On May 16, 1979, Zions obtained an order in Zions 
II (per Durham, J.) determining that Water Park owned the Store 
Tract, that Betty Purcell was the sole shareholder of Water Park, 
that Water Park had been dissolved on September 30, 1977, and 
that Betty Purcell became the owner of the subject real property 
on September 30, 1977 by virtue of the dissolution. The order 
stated further that: 
"Any judgment lien [Zions] may have against 
defendant [Purcell] which is properly dock-
eted in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Clerk constitutes a lien upon the above-
-12-
described property [the Store Tract] as of 
the date of such docketing if subsequent to 
September 30, 1977. If any such judgment is 
docketed prior to September 30, 1977, such 
judgment shall constitute a lien commencing 
September 30, 1977. (R. 84.) 
Zions had no judgment against Betty Purcell on the date Judge 
Durham entered this order. The Blodgetts were not parties or 
participants in Zions I or Zions II. (R. 83, 84.) 
25. On or about May 29, 1979, Joe Martsch quitclaimed 
all interest he had in the Car Wash Tract and in the Store Tract 
to the Blodgetts, thus conveying to them his one-half undivided 
interest in the Store Tract and his interest in the Car Wash 
Tract. (R. 84f 102, see also Ad. 10.) 
26. On June 1, 1979, Zions obtained a second default 
judgment against Betty Purcell in Zions I. The amount of the 
judgment was $27,262.59 — $3,801.93 less than the amount of the 
original default judgment Zions had obtained against her. (R. 
84.) 
27. On December 7, 1979, the trial court in Blodgett I 
and Blodgett II (per Baldwin, J.) held a pretrial hearing during 
which the parties settled both cases. The terms of the settle-
ment were read into the record. (R. 84, 85, 103-07.) 
28. On December 7, 1979, Judge Baldwin entered an 
order in Blodgett I and Blodgett II (the "Settlement Order") 
approving the settlement reached at the pre-trial hearing. A 
certified copy of the December 7, 1979 Minute Order in Civil No. 
223407 is annexed. (Ad. 22.) 
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29. The terms of settlement approved in the Settlement 
Order provided for: (1) execution of quitclaim deeds by the 
defendants in Blodgett I and Blodgett II conveying the Store 
Tract to the Blodgetts; (2) payment of damages to the Blodgetts; 
(3) dismissal with prejudice of the Blodgetts1 actions; (4) a 
court order quieting title to the Store Tract in the Blodgetts. 
(R. 103-07.) 
30. On January 15, 1980, Betty Purcell executed a 
quitclaim deed and delivered it to the Blodgetts pursuant to the 
terms approved in the Settlement Order. (R. 109-12.) 
31. On May 5, 1980, the trial court (per Baldwin, J.) 
entered an order (the "Dismissal Order") dismissing Betty Purcell 
as a defendant in Blodgett I and Blodgett II. The Dismissal 
Order did not include all of the terms of the settlement read 
into the record at the pre-trial hearing before Judge Baldwin. 
(R. 85.) 
32. In 1984 Zions commenced an action in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, to renew its Zions I 
judgments ("Zions III"). Zions First National Bank v. Lorin N. 
Pace, No. C84-0299. (See Ad. 11.) After Zions III was filed, 
Lorin Pace, father of Appellant Stanley Pace, paid Zions 
$27,262.59, on August 31, 1984, for amounts due under the 
judgment against him. (R. 85, 86.) Counsel for Zions confirmed 
the payment by Lorin Pace in a letter dated August 18, 1986, a 
copy of which is annexed. (Ad. 11.) The letter substantiates and 
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explains Zions1 averment in its answer in this case that it makes 
no claim to the subject property. (R. 68.) 
33. On or about August 31, 1984, Zions purportedly 
assigned its judgment of May 16, 1979 in Zions I and its judgment 
of June 2, 1979 in Zions II to Alco. (See R. 85, 86.) Alco's 
DBA expired approximately three weeks later on September 22, 
1984. (Ad. 4-5.) 
34. On April 19, 1985, the Blodgetts received an in-
formal notice to enforce lien from Alco. The notice stated that 
Alco intended to execute on any judgment lien received by it from 
Zions. (R. 86.) 
35. On May 24, 1985, the Blodgetts brought the instant 
action ("Blodgett III") against Zions, Stanley Pace, McComb and 
Alco to quiet title to the Store Tract in the Blodgetts. The 
Blodgetts also recorded a lis pendens. (Id.) 
36. On January 16, 1986 the trial court (per Sawaya, 
J.) entered an order in Blodgett III granting the Blodgetts1 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 134-37.) The judgment states: 
Therefore, the court hereby orders, ad-
judges and decrees that: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of 
defendants, Stanley L. Pace and Allen D. 
McComb dba Alco Investment, is denied. 
2. The Motion of plaintiffs as against 
all defendants, Zions First National Bank, 
Stanley L. Pace and Allen D. McComb dba Alco 
Investment, is granted as follows: 
a. The judgment liens that arise on 
behalf of the defendant, Zions First National 
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Bank, within the civil actions known as Zions 
Bank vs. Purcell and Pace, Civil S/>. 232782 
[Zions I] and Zions Bank vs. Purcell, Civil 
No. C79-1685, [Zions II], filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, which judgment liens and their 
underlying judgments have been assigned to 
defendants, Stanley L. Pace and Allen D. 
McComb, dba Alco Investment, are void and of 
no effect as against the real property that 
is the subject of this action, [the Store 
Tract] identified as [description omitted]. 
b. Title to the above-identified 
real property is quieted in the plaintiffs 
[the Blodgetts] as against any and all right, 
title, or interest claimed by the defendants, 
Zions First National Bank and Stanley L. Pace 
and Allen D. McComb dba Alco Investment. 
(R. 135-37.) 
37. On August 13, 1986, the trial court in Blodgett I 
and Blodgett II (per Dee, J.) entered an order (the "Order and 
Judgment of Quiet Title") granting the Blodgetts1 unopposed 
Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and Enter Judgment of 
Quiet Title. The Blodgetts filed the motion on March 17, 1986 to 
correct a clerical error in the Dismissal Order to accord with 
the settlement that had been read into the record and approved by 
the trial court (per Baldwin, J.). Even though not required to 
do so, the Blodgetts personally served Betty Purcell with a copy 
of the motion. (Ad. 23.) The Order and Judgment of Quiet Title 
provide: 
The court being fully advised in the 
premises and having considered the Motion of 
plaintiff hereby orders, adjudges and 
decrees: 
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1. The Order of Dismissal against 
defendant Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell 
Martsch, signed and entered May 5, 1980 by 
the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., is 
hereby set aside. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered against 
Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, 
quieting Title of all right, title and inter-
est of said defendant within the following 
identified real property in and to the plain-
tiffs1 , William D. BLodgett and Florence G. 
Blodgett. The real property to which this 
quiet title judgment applies is located 
within Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and 
is more particularly identified as: 
[description omittedl. 
This Order shall relate back to and be 
effective as of May 5, 1980. 
The Complaint of plaintiffs against defen-
dants Betty Purcell Martsch, Raco Car Wash 
Systems, Inc., and Water Park Corporation is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice and any and 
all counter-claims of said defendants are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice with the 
parties to bear their own costs. 
The sum of $2,400 on deposit with the court 
in this case be paid over to plaintiffs by 
the clerk of the court. 
A copy of the Order and Judgment of Quiet Title is annexed. (Ad. 
23-25.) 
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF EVENTS 
1969 Blodgetts lease Car Wash 
Tract to Raco and agree to 
pledge that tract only for 
loan to finance installation 
07/07/71 
11/05/71 
1973 
Blodgetts close loan with 
Valley Bank, unknowingly 
pledge Car Wash Tract and 
Store Tract, sign note 
Raco defaults on loan 
Valley Bank via Ashworth, 
Trustee, forecloses both 
tracts; Purcell's ex-husband 
Martsch bids high for both 
tracts 
Lorin Pace and Purcell 
make demand note to Zions 
($27,262.59) 
10/12/78 Trustee deed issued to Martsch 
Martsch claims ownership to 
Blodgetts 
11/08/73 Martsch coveys 1/2 intrest in 
Store Tract to Purcell's Water 
Park; Lorin Pace notarizes quit 
claim deed 
11/04/74 
01/16/76 
Blodgetts sue Purcell, Martsch 
and others, file lis pendens 
(Blodgett I) 
Summary judgment against 
Blodgetts who appeal 
Zions sues Purcell and 
Lorin Pace for demand note 
(Zions I) 
Date 
03/03/76 
08/13/76 
09/30/77 
1978 
Blodgett Transactions 
and Suits 
03/13/79 
04/11/79 
05/01/79 
05/02/79 
05/16/79 
Water Park is dissolved; 
Purcell takes its assets, 
becomes owner of Store Tract 
Utah Supreme Court orders 
trial in Blodgett I 
Blodgetts sue Water Park and 
Purcell to terminate their 
interests in Store Tract 
(Blodgett II) 
Blodgett I and Blodgett II 
consolidated for trial 
Default order conveys rights 
of Water Park in Store Tract 
to Blodgetts 
Zions/Pace/Purcell/Alco 
Transactions and Suits 
Zions takes default 
against Lorin Pace 
($31,064.52) 
Zions takes default 
against Purcell 
($31,064.52) 
Zions sues Purcell to 
enforce judgment in 
Zions I (Zions II) 
Default in Zions I against 
Purcell vacated 
Zions obtains order that 
Water Park was dissolved; 
Purcell, as sole owner, 
took its assets to become 
sole owner of Store Tract 
on Water Park's 
dissolution Sept. 30, 
1977; Zions may docket 
lien against Store Tract 
effective September 30, 
1977 
Date 
Blodgett Transactions 
and Suits 
Zions/Pace/Purcell/Alco 
Transactions and Suits 
05/29/79 
06/01/79 
12/07/79 
01/15/80 
05/05/80 
1984 
08/31/84 
08/31/84 
09/22/84 
04/19/85 
05/24/85 
Martsch quitclaims 1/2 
interest in Store Tract 
to Blodgetts 
Blodgett I and JJ_ settled 
a) quit claims on record; 
on Store Tract to Blodgetts; 
b) damages to Blodgetts; 
c) quiet title to Blodgetts; 
d) suits dismissed with 
prej udice 
Purcell, Raco, Water Park 
quitclaim interest in 
Store Tract to Blodgetts 
Dismissal order in Blodgett I 
and 21 (corrected 8/13/86 to 
match terms in record of 
December 7, 1979) - title 
quieted to Blodgetts 
Alco notifies Blodgetts of 
intent to execute judgment 
against Store Tract 
Blodgetts sue Zions, S. Pace, 
McComb and Alco (Blodgett III); 
Blodgetts file lis pendens 
Zions denies interest in 
Store Tract 
Zions takes second 
default against Purcell 
in Zions I ($27,262.59) 
Zions renews judgment 
against Lorin Pace and 
Purcell (Zions III) 
Lorin Pace pays Zions 
$27,262.59 (face amount 
of note) 
Zions assigns judgment to 
Alco 
Alco dba expires and not 
renewed 
Blodgett Transactions Zions/Pace/Purcell/Alco 
Date and Suits Transactions and Suits 
01/16/86 Blodgetts obtain summary 
judgment against Alco et 
al. ; appeal taken 
08/13/86 Trial court corrects clerical 
error in judgment, effective 
May 5, 1980 to quiet title in 
Blodgetts 
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KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his wife, 
r I, ii 111 11 I ., 
vs. 
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL, 
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
OF QUIET TITLE 
Civil No. 223407 and 
C-78-8017 (Consolidated) 
Be ll remembered that Plaintiffs' Motion 
of Dismissal and Enter Judgment nl Quiet hearing 
before the Honorable David B. nee, « the above entitled court on 
May 2, 1986, at the hour of ten n'i, ]o<l< ii in 
.ntiff was present by and through it's counsel of 
record, .ester of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell. Defen-
de 
either In person or through counsel defendant having been 
previously served with Plaintiffs' Motion and the associated 
pleadings personal 
41 
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;ITY 
1 
T h e l i" , ' J | " i " *• i ' 11 i' n g 
considered the Motion of plaintiff hereby orders, djudges and 
decrees; 
J rl:ie 01:dei: • :: • f Dismissal agai 
aka Betty Purcell Martsch, signed and entere: May he 
H o i i c r a lb 1 e B a 1 d w i hereby set aside, 
2 udgment is hereby entered against Betty Purcell aka 
Betty Purcell Martsch, gu-ieting Title ot 11 right, title and 
interesl I • ill  d e l vt .1 a111 i *al 
property in anc the plaintiffs1, William D. Blodgett and Florence 
G. Blodget ,t ' property to which this quiet title judgement 
applies i s located within Salt Lake County, Stai 
more particularly identified as: 
Beginning at a point in the center of Highland Drive 
on the projected North line of Vine Street (6100 South), 
said point being North 668.9 feet, more or less, and 
West 215.3 feet, more or less, from the Southeast 
corner of Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
0°20 f50" East along center line of Highland Drive 154.0 
feet; thence south 89°15,45fl West 197.17 feet; thence South 
0°17 l45" West 154.0 feet to North line of Vine Street 
(6100 South); thence North S g ^ S M S " East along said North 
line 197.03 feet to the point of beginnning. 
Excluding from said above-described property that ceilaiin 
property taken by Salt Lake County as a part of the 
Cottonwood Expressway, Project S-016Q-1, and more part-
icularly described as follows: Beginning at the 
intersections of grantors West property line and centerline 
of survey at Engineer's Station 176+92.29, which point is 
North 668.90 feet and West 484.09 feet from the Southeast 
corner of said Section 16; and tangency to the curve of said 
Engineer's Station 176+92.29 bearing South 38 o54 f40" East; 
thence North 116.0 feet to a point on a 2367,0 foot radius 
- 2 -
I 
curve to the right; thence Southeasterly along the arc of 
said curve a distance of 150.20 feet, more or less, to the 
North line of 6100 South Street; thence West along the North 
line of 6100 South Street 95.41 feet, more or less, to 
grantors West boundary line, the place of beginning, less 
Tract deeded to Salt Lake County and Street. 
May "Ji, I960', 
I Complaint of plaintiffs ainst defendants Betty 
Purcell Hartsch, Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc., and Wate 
ation is hereby dismissed with prejudice and any and all countei 
c 1 a iii in mi ii' I 11: II I in mi in I ' in 11 mi Il i in i I i y d i s m i s s e d w i 1 1 : :t p r e judice with 
the parties to bear their own costs. 
5. The sum $2,450 on deposit with the court in this 
case be paid over t :»" plaintiffs 
Dated this / jb day of August, 1986. 
3TVTE OP UTAH ) -, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) °" 
I. THi UNO!**ONIO, CLERK OF THE OUTPffCT 
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY. UTAH DO HfiRKY 
CgRTiPT THAT THi ANNEXED AMD FOREGONG It 
A TRUE AttO FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOOU-
M5WT ON FILE 1H MY OFF.'CE AS ftUOH CiEBK. 
WITNW8 MY HAND A&O^EAL Of SAID COURT 
THIS - Z J L DAY OF /%7^(/rtjT 19 X^L 
H. Dt>«5N>#NDCEY, GLB 
IBY ^rZ/?^Az^z^ c* 
BY THE COURT: 
strict Judge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HIHQLEY 
i • ^^a^A 
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